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Self-Policing in Politics: The Political Economy of Reputational Controls on Politicians
Glenn R. Parker
€ 80.40
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Description for Self-Policing in Politics: The Political Economy of Reputational Controls on Politicians
Hardback. Contrary to what news reports might suggest, the majority of politicians behave ethically and are never subject to investigations. This title argues that members of Congress behave ethnically not because of the fear of punishment but because of their concern for their reputations. It draws parallels between politicians and businesses. Num Pages: 192 pages, 4 line illus. 35 tables. BIC Classification: 1KBB; HPQ; JP. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational; (U) Tertiary Education (US: College). Dimension: 229 x 152 x 12. Weight in Grams: 428.
Contrary to what news reports might suggest, the majority of politicians behave ethically and are never subject to investigations. Is this because of the elaborate system of rules Congress has constructed to regulate the conduct of its members as well as the fear of electoral reprisal? Drawing on economic literature on the behavior of firms, Glenn Parker answers no. He argues that members of Congress behave ethnically not because of the fear of punishment but because of their concern for their reputations. He draws parallels between politicians and businesses, since both stand to suffer significantly when accused of wrongdoing. Just ... Read more
Contrary to what news reports might suggest, the majority of politicians behave ethically and are never subject to investigations. Is this because of the elaborate system of rules Congress has constructed to regulate the conduct of its members as well as the fear of electoral reprisal? Drawing on economic literature on the behavior of firms, Glenn Parker answers no. He argues that members of Congress behave ethnically not because of the fear of punishment but because of their concern for their reputations. He draws parallels between politicians and businesses, since both stand to suffer significantly when accused of wrongdoing. Just ... Read more
Product Details
Format
Hardback
Publication date
2004
Publisher
Princeton University Press United States
Number of pages
194
Condition
New
Number of Pages
192
Place of Publication
New Jersey, United States
ISBN
9780691117393
SKU
V9780691117393
Shipping Time
Usually ships in 7 to 11 working days
Ref
99-1
About Glenn R. Parker
Glenn R. Parker is Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Purdue Univeristy. He is the author of "Congress and the Rent-Seeking Society".
Reviews for Self-Policing in Politics: The Political Economy of Reputational Controls on Politicians
"A number of important issues ... are carefully explored in this rich and important analysis."
Gary W. Copeland, Perspectives on Politics
Gary W. Copeland, Perspectives on Politics